Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 25
Issue 3 Spring 1994

Article 4

1994

When First Time Is Not First in Right: The
Supreme Court Frustrate Judgement Creditors in
United States v. McDermott
Michael D. McCullough

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Michael D. McCullough, When First Time Is Not First in Right: The Supreme Court Frustrate Judgement Creditors in United States v.
McDermott, 25 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 405 (1994).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol25/iss3/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Notes
When First in Time is Not First in Right: The
Supreme Court Frustrates Judgment Creditors
in United States v. McDermott
[The Nation should] have a tax system which looks like someone designed it on purpose.'
I. INTRODUCTION

As the level of consumer debt continues to rise in the United States,2
many creditors find debt collection increasingly difficult.3
Consequently, creditors may seek to obtain judgments through the
legal system in order to assist in collecting debts. Creditors, however,
should be wary of United States v. McDermott,4 a recent Supreme
Court decision that diminishes the effectiveness of obtaining judgments from debtors who are subject to federal tax liens.
In cases in which a debtor remains solvent but defaults on debt
repayments, a creditor may protect its position by securing a garnishment against the debtor or by attaching the debtor's assets.5 Yet even
1. William E. Simon, quoted in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR
BASIC TAX REFORM 1 (1977), reprinted in FRED R. SHAPIRO, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 401 (1993) (alteration in original).
2. In October 1993, the consumer installment debt increased by $8.1 billion over the
previous three months, bringing the adjusted total to $776.71 billion. Robert D.
Hershey, Jr., Consumer Installment Debt Jumps, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1993, Late Edition,
at DI. This figure represents roughly $3,000 of debt for every man, woman, and child in
this country. The increase also represents the largest monthly increase since January
1988, with the exception of a 1989 increase caused by a technical change in the compilation method. Id. Moreover, these figures do not include automobile leases or home
equity loans. Id.
3. The number of bankruptcies filed in the United States is but one way of illustrating
the problems experienced by creditors. According to the American Bankruptcy Institute,
1992 saw a record number of 971,517 bankruptcies filed in U.S. courts, 92% of which
were personal bankruptcies. Bankruptcy Filings Rise, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 18, 1993, at
C3.
4. 113 S. Ct. 1526 (1993). In McDermott, the Court weighed the competing claims
of a federal tax lien and a state judgment lien on a debtor's after-acquired property. The
Court granted priority to the federal tax lien even though the judgment lien was created
before notice of the tax lien was filed. Id. at 1530-31.
5. Generally, a creditor may only seize property pursuant to a lien-a property interest created to secure a debt. Steve H. Nickles, Lecture, The Brendan Brown Lecture:
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when a debtor is solvent, attachment or garnishment affords a creditor
only a relatively low level of security. 6 Consequently, a creditor may
choose to bolster its position by returning to the courts for a judgment
against the defaulting debtor. Generally, the docketing of a judgment
creates a lien that attaches to the debtor's real property and sometimes
to the debtor's personal property.7 In addition, state judgment lien
statutes commonly provide that the lien attaches to property the debtor
does not yet own but will later acquire-so-called "after-acquired
property. 8
Still, a judgment lien does not guarantee that the creditor will be
paid, since there may also be other secured creditors. This risk arises
from the common law rule of lien priority, set forth in the adage "first
in time is first in right." 9 In other words, to insure collection, a judgRadical Reductionism in Debtor-Creditor Law, 39 CATH.U. L. REV. 765, 765 (1990). A
creditor holding a lien is a secured creditor with a legal right to possess collateral that
may be forcibly applied to satisfy the secured debt. Id. If there is not enough property
to satisfy all lienholders, unsecured creditors (those creditors without liens or with liens
unsupported by value) will likely remain unpaid. See id. at 766. Accordingly, creditors
generally seek liens as early as possible. Id. For further discussion of these points, see
generally id. at 765-69.
6. Unlike a judgment lien, the attachment or garnishment lien is considered
"inchoate," meaning that it is open to contingencies that stand in the way of execution.
See United States v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 50 (1950). Accordingly,
securing an attachment or garnishment lien is often an intermediate step taken prior to
obtaining a judgment. See infra part II.B for further discussion of the inchoate lien.
7. See generally 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 454-58, 471-73, 477 (1947); 46 Am. Jur.
2d Judgments § 257 (1969). The modern judgment lien developed from the Statute of
Westminster II, which was enacted in the year 1285. 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 454 (1947).
It often exists today as a creature of statute. Id. Utah has a typical judgment lien statute,
which provides in relevant part:
From the time the judgment of the district court or circuit court is docketed and
filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of the county it becomes a
lien upon all the real property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in the county in which judgment is entered, owned by him at the time or
by him thereafter acquired during the existence of said lien .... The lien shall
continue for eight years unless the judgment is previously satisfied . . . in
which case the lien of the judgment ceases.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22-1 (1992). As with the Utah lien, it is usually essential that
there be a final judgment for a specific sum that is capable of collection by execution
upon the debtor's property. 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 458 (1947). Unlike other liens,
however, a judgment lien is normally a general lien upon all real property held by the
debtor, rather than upon specific property. 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 455 (1947). For
further discussion of the judgment lien, see infra part IV.A.
8. 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 257 (1969); 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 477 (1947). See
supra note 7 (setting forth the text of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22-1 (1992), which states
that the judgment lien is a lien on property "owned or acquired during the existence of
the judgment, located in the county in which the judgment is entered" (emphasis added)).
9. See Rankin & Schatzell v. Scott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 177, 179 (1827) ("The principle is believed to be universal, that a prior lien gives a prior claim, which is entitled to
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ment creditor generally must win the race to be the first to docket its
lien and thereby gain priority over other creditors.'0
Yet even then, federal tax law may frustrate a judgment lien creditor
who stands "first in time." Under the Internal Revenue Code, persons
who refuse to pay federal taxes after demand will have a lien placed
upon all of their real and personal property." This lien arises on the
date that the tax is originally assessed against the taxpayer. 2
Consequently, a creditor who finds a solvent debtor in default,
garnishes the debtor's wages, prevails in a litigation battle, obtains a
judgment, and, finally, wins the race to docket its judgment still cannot
rest easy, since the United States government may also be a creditor.
prior satisfaction .... ").
10. In the case of secured transactions covered by the Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C."), the general rule is that lien priority follows the order in which liens are
perfected. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a), 3A U.L.A. 350 (1992). For example, when the collateral securing a lien is one or more accounts receivable, chattel paper, or inventory, a
financing statement must be filed with the appropriate state authority. U.C.C. § 9302(1), 3A U.L.A. 50. A financing statement is valid under the U.C.C. if it is signed by
the debtor, provides the names and addresses of the debtor and secured party, and gives a
description of the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-402(1), 3A U.L.A. 546. In any event, merely
attaching a creditor's security interest to specific collateral is not enough to perfect a
lien. U.C.C. § 9-303(1), 3A U.L.A. 117. The security interest is only perfected when
both the security interest attaches and the financing statement is filed. Id.
According to one commentator, "'[p]erfection' refers to the steps necessary to make a
lien or other interest in property enforceable, as far as is legally possible, against third
parties' claims." Steve H. Nickles, Setting Farmers Free: Righting the Unintended
Anomaly of UCC Section 9-312(2), 71 MINN. L. REV. 1135, 1147 (1987). Perfection
usually requires some form of "notorious conduct," such as a public filing, which
provides notice of the interest to the public. Id. According to Nickles, "[a]n effect of a
perfection requirement, if not also a purpose, is to establish a clear, certain, and uniform
signal as to when a lien or other interest has been created for purposes of applying the
first-in-time rule. The efficiency of the rule is thereby enhanced." Id. at 1149. "In most
cases the secured party may obtain perfection either by filing ...or by taking possession of the collateral." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1137 (6th ed. 1990) (defining the
perfection of a security interest).
11. 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1988). Section 6321 provides:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after
demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to
tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition
thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and
rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.
Id.
12. 26 U.S.C. § 6322 (1988). Section 6322 states:
Unless another date is specifically fixed by law, the lien imposed by section
6321 shall arise at the time the assessment is made and shall continue until the
liability for the amount so assessed (or a judgment against the taxpayer arising out of such liability) is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason of
lapse of time.
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On March 24, 1993, the Supreme Court decided United States v.
McDermott,13 in which it held that a judgment creditor's lien on afteracquired property did not have the "choateness" necessary to enjoy
priority over a later-filed federal tax lien. 4 According to the Court, a
judgment lien on after-acquired property cannot be choate because the
property subject to the lien cannot be established until the debtor
acquires it.' 5 Therefore, the private judgment lien cannot take priority
over a federal tax lien unless the debtor acquires the property before
the notice of the federal tax lien is filed. 6 This decision effectively
subordinates all private judgment liens on after-acquired property to
federal tax liens, except in those cases where the IRS fails to file notice
before the debtor acquires the property.
This Note analyzes the McDermott decision and the effect it will
have on judgment creditors. The Note begins by examining the federal
tax lien from an historical perspective, reviewing its creation, evolution, and the protection that Congress has afforded private creditors
from federal tax liens." It then examines the "choateness" doctrine
and the key decisions applying the doctrine in weighing private creditors' claims. 18 Finally, this Note discusses United States v.
McDermott, concluding that it overlooks the nature of the judgment
lien, undercuts more than eighty years of law protecting judgment
creditors, and ignores significant implications regarding debtorcreditor relations.19
II.BACKGROUND
In McDermott, the Supreme Court based its analysis on past legislation that gave judgment lienholders priority in certain circumstances
and on judicial decisions outlining and interpreting the requirement that
private liens be "choate" to receive priority. 20 Accordingly, this Part
first provides an historical perspective on the creation and evolution of
13. 113 S. Ct. 1526 (1993).
14. Id. at 1530. In United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963), the
Supreme Court required that judgment creditors' liens be "choate" in order to have priority over a later federal tax lien. Id. at 89. According to the Court, to be "choate," the
lienor's identity, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien must be
established. Id. For further discussion of the doctrine of choateness, see infra part ll.B.
15. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1529-30.
16. Id.
17. See infra part II.A.
18. See infra part II.B.
19. See infra parts III-V.
20. See McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1528-30. For a definition of "choate" in the
context of lien priority, see infra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
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the federal tax lien, examining the protection from federal tax liens that
private creditors have received. It then reviews the decisions
establishing the "choateness" doctrine, which is used to evaluate the
merits of private lienholder priority claims. Finally, this Part reviews
the most recent legislation governing the federal tax lien, the Federal
Tax Lien Act of 196621 ("FTLA").
A. The History of the FederalTax Lien and CreditorProtection
Soon after its formation, Congress addressed the priority of all
types of federal claims. In 1789, Congress enacted what has come
to be known as the "Insolvency Statute, 23 which gave the federal
government priority over all claims in certain cases of insolvency.24
Yet as the Civil War led to an expansion of the government's revenue
requirements, tax collection was frustrated at times by a loophole in the
Insolvency Statute that allowed debtors to defeat federal priority by
transferring their assets to a third party before the government could
enforce its liens.25 The government thus had a need for a lien that
would secure its tax claims in cases where the Insolvency Statute did
not apply: where the delinquent taxpayer was solvent.26 Congress
reacted by authorizing a federal tax lien on solvent debtors that attached
to all of the debtor's property immediately upon the debtor's failure to
pay federal taxes when due.27 Under the Insolvency Statute, taxpayers
had been able to refuse to pay federal taxes and then transfer their
assets before the government began enforcement proceedings, thus
21. Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (1966) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.). This Note will focus upon those portions of the FTLA that are
codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321, 6322, and 6323(a) (1988).
2 2. WILLIAM T. PLUMB, JR., FEDERAL TAX LIENS 191 (3d ed. 1972).
23. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 21, 1 Stat. 42. The Act of July 31, 1789 was the
fifth statute enacted by the First Congress. William T. Plumb, Jr., Federal Liens and
Priorities-Agendafor the Next Decade, 77 YALE L.J. 228, 234 n.45 (1967). The
Insolvency Statute is codified in its current form at 31 U.S.C. § 3713(a)(1) (1988). The
law has retained substantially the same form since the Act of March 3, 1797, ch. 20, § 5,
i Stat. 515. Plumb, supra, at 234 n.45.
24. The current version of the Insolvency Statute reads in part: "A claim of the United
States Government shall be paid first when (A) a person indebted to the Government is
insolvent .... ." 31 U.S.C. § 3713(a)(1) (1988). The Insolvency Statute was deemed
constitutional in 1805. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 396-97 (1805).
25. Christopher L. Hencke, Note, Nesbitt v. United States: Denying an Implied Tax
Lien Exception to the Federal Priority in Insolvency, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 741, 749-50
(1984).
26. See Frank R. Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The
Pernicious Careerof the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905, 919-20 (1954).
27. Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 9, 14 Stat. 107. The current version of this early
legislation is found at 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1988). See supra note II for the text of
§ 6321.
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leaving the federal government with priority over nothing.28 In
contrast, the new statute allowed the taxpayer's assets to be encumbered with a lien as soon as the taxpayer refused to pay; the lien would
stay attached to the assets even if transferred to another party.29
The early federal tax lien proved burdensome to private creditors of
tax debtors. The federal tax lien did not have to be filed or recorded to
be valid 30 and,' consequently, could operate unknown to the public as a
"secret lien."', Despite the seeming inequity of this, the Supreme
Court ruled in United States v. Snyder32 that an unfiled federal tax lien
took priority over a claim held by a good faith purchaser of real property who bought without notice of the lien.33 After Snyder, buyers
could find their new property burdened with liens that they had no
means of discovering, and the federal government could execute such
liens through a forced sale of the property.34 As one commentator
stated, "Snyder imposed individual hardships and impaired alienation

28. See Kennedy, supra note 26, at 919-20.
29. See id.
30. See PLUMB, supra note 22, at 53.
3 1. See Plumb, supra note 23, at 229. The government has an interest in withholding
notice of its liens: Public notice of liens against a taxpayer will substantially curtail the
taxpayer's ability to obtain credit, which in turn reduces the chances that the taxpayer
will regain sufficient financial stability to satisfy the tax debt. PLUMB, supra note 22, at
131. As a result, the government has made a practice of withholding public notice
whenever it believes that there is a reasonable chance that a delinquent taxpayer will
regain financial stability. Id. (citing United States v. Speers, 382 U.S. 266, 276 n.21
(1965); S. REP. No. 277, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1965) (stating the Treasury
Department's position)).
32. 149 U.S. 210 (1893).
33. Snyder, 149 U.S. at 213-14. In Snyder, a federal lien for unpaid tobacco taxes
attached to realty held by Snyder, a tax debtor. Id. at 211. Two years later, Snyder sold
the property to the International Cotton Press Company ("International"), which
bought without knowledge of the unfiled tax lien. Id. Even though International was an
innocent purchaser, the Court held that the land transferred to International remained
subject to the lien and reasoned that if federal taxes "can be thwarted by . . . a state
statute [requiring the federal government to file notice of its lien] . . . it would follow
that the potential existence of the government of the United States is at the mercy of
state legislation." Id. at 214.
34. See Hencke, supra note 25, at 751-52. The federal tax lien statute effectively
required prospective buyers to "[ascertain]from all the collectors in the United States
whether or not the vendor was delinquent in the payment of taxes." H.R. REP. No. 1018,
62d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1912) (emphasis added).
Following the Snyder decision, a district court allowed such a forced sale. United
States v. Curry, 201 F. 371 (D. Md. 1912). Still, the Curry court recommended that the
tax lien statute be amended to remedy the inequity of this type of sale. Id. at 374.
Congress subsequently enacted legislation that called for the government to file notice
to make its liens valid against mortgagees, purchasers, and judgment creditors. See infra
notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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of property. 35
Since the Snyder decision, Congress has amended the law governing federal tax liens to soften their impact on various parties and to
provide protection to certain private creditors. In 1913, Congress
provided protection to purchasers, mortgagees, and judgment creditors36 by imposing upon the federal government a "notice-filing provision," which requires the government to file notice in a designated
office in order to achieve priority.37
35. Kennedy, supra note 26, at 920-2 1.
36. The phrase "judgment creditor" is not defined in federal tax lien statutes. Don
King Prods., Inc. v. Thomas, 945 F.2d 529, 533 (2d Cir. 1991). Current Treasury
Department regulations specify that to achieve judgment creditor status, a creditor must
"[obtain] a valid judgment, in a court of record and of competent jurisdiction, for the
recovery of specifically designated property or for a certain sum of money." Treas. Reg.
§ 301.6323(h)-l(g) (1993). The Supreme Court has stated that "Congress used the words
'judgment creditor' in § 3672 [the predecessor of 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a)] in the usual,
conventional sense of a judgment of a court of record ......
United States v. Gilbert
Assocs., Inc., 345 U.S. 361, 364 (1953).
Nevertheless, obtaining a judgment alone may not guarantee judgment creditor status
for purposes of priority over other liens. For example, in Fore v. United States, 339
F.2d 70, 71 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 912 (1965), a creditor who had
obtained a judgment claimed to have priority over a federal tax lien even though he had
not fixed a lien to the debtor's personalty before the federal government filed its tax
lien. The Fifth Circuit rejected this view, ruling that to achieve priority, the creditor
would have to become a judgment lien creditor. Id. at 72. Indeed, today the tax code
specifically refers to "judgment lien creditor[s]." See William F. Young, Jr., Priority of
the Federal Tax Lien, 34 U. CI. L. REV. 723, 728 (1967).
37. Act of Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 166, 37 Stat. 1016 ("[A federal tax] lien shall not be
valid as against any mortgagee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice of such lien
shall be filed by the collector .
) (current version codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a)
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
To illustrate the effect of the notice-filing provision, suppose a tax assessment of
$50,000 is made on January 1 against a taxpayer who fails to pay upon demand. The
taxpayer owns a home worth $75,000, and on January 15, one of the taxpayer's private
creditors files a judgment against him in the county of his residence, creating a judgment
lien against the home. Finally, suppose the IRS files proper notice of the federal tax
lien on January 20.
Without the benefit of the notice-filing provision, the private creditor's judgment lien
would be subordinated to the IRS lien since, according to § 6322 (set forth supra note
12), the federal lien arose upon the January I assessment, two weeks before the private
creditor's judgment lien arose. Pursuant to the notice-filing provision, however, the
private creditor's judgment lien would have priority as to the taxpayer's residence. Even
though the IRS lien arose on January I, the notice-filing provision provides that it did
not become valid against the private creditor's judgment lien until notice of it was filed
on January 20. Since validity of a lien is not retroactive, the private creditor's filing on
January 15 entitles it to priority. See Fed. Tax. Coordinator 2d (Res. Inst. Am.) I V6302 pp. 54,411-12 (1992).
Congress added pledgees as a class protected by the notice filing provision in 1939.
Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 247, § 401, 53 Stat. 882. Congress replaced pledgees and
mortgagees with mechanic's lienors and "holder[s] of a security interest" as protected
parties in 1966. Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125
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Congress also recognized that searches for federal tax liens are
sometimes impractical.3 1 Consequently, it granted "superpriority"priority over already existing and filed federal tax liens-to both
lenders secured by securities and purchasers of securities.39 In 1964,
Congress extended superpriority status to purchasers of motor vehicles.4" With the passage of the FTLA in 1966, Congress further
expanded superpriority status by adding additional classes.4' Still, the
protection from federal tax lien priority remained restricted to those
creditors expressly protected by statute; for all others, federal tax liens
assumed priority upon tax assessment, regardless of the date the
government filed notice. 42
B. The ChoatenessDoctrine: Limits on CreditorProtection
Even as Congress was extending protection from federal liens to
private creditors in the early part of this century, the Treasury was
turning with greater frequency to the tax lien as a method of collecting
its debts.43 Mindful of the federal government's interest in collecting
the debts owed to it," courts experienced increasing litigation related
(1966) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
3 8. Plumb, supra note 23, at 229; PLUMB, supra note 22, at 54 ("Congress was aware
that the burden of this search [for prior notices of tax liens] would seriously hamper the
transferability of certain properties and would result in injustice to purchasers who could
not be expected to (or could not possibly) make a search for federal tax liens.").
39. Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 247, § 401, 53 Stat. 882, 883 (currently codified at 26
U.S.C. § 6323(b)(1) (1988)); see PLUMB, supra note 22, at 54. The purpose of this
superpriority protection was disclosed in the committee report accompanying the bill.
United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 53 (1950) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). The report states:
While it is true that the filing of the notice of the tax lien may constitute
notice in the case of real property, it is inequitable for the statute to provide
that it constitutes notice as regards securities .... An attempt to enforce such
liens on recorded notice would in many cases impair the negotiability of securities and seriously interfere with business transactions.
H.R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1939).
40. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 236, 78 Stat. 127 (currently codified
at 26 U.S.C § 6323(b)(2) (1988)).
41. See infra part II.C for further discussion of the FTLA.
42. Plumb, supra note 23, at 229.
43. Peter F. Coogan, The Effect of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 Upon Security
Interests Created Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1376
(1968).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715, 734 (1979) ("The
importance of securing adequate revenues to discharge national obligations justifies the
extraordinary priority accorded federal tax liens through the choateness and first-in-time
doctrines."); Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935) ("[T]axes are the lifeblood of government, and their prompt and certain availability an imperious need
.... Security.);Trust, 340 U.S. at 51 ("[Tlhe purpose of the federal tax lien statute [is]
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to the concessions Congress had provided to private creditors. 45 In an
effort to assign priority to various creditors, the Supreme Court began
to use the choateness doctrine to evaluate claims of private creditors.'
The effect of this doctrine is that in spite of its purported deference to
the "first in time" policy, 47 the Court has given the federal government
absolute priority over all private liens that are not choate. 4 The Court
to insure prompt and certain collection of taxes."); Frank R. Kennedy, From Spokane
County to Vermont: The Campaign of the Federal Government Against the Inchoate
Lien, 50 IOWA L. REV. 724, 750 (1965) ("The premise has been that the paramount need
is the collection of federal claims .... ").
45. E.g., United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351 (1964); United States v. Pioneer
Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963); United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81
(1954); United States v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950). For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 52-68 and accompanying text.
46. The choateness doctrine sprang from the decision in Spokane County v. United
States, 279 U.S. 80 (1929). In Spokane County, the Supreme Court of Washington had
ruled that two counties' property taxes created a binding lien only on the specific property against which the taxes were assessed. Id. at 94. The Court, relying on this ruling
and assuming that none of the property held by the receiver was assessed for taxes until
after the federal priority had attached, ruled that the county's nonspecific liens were
subordinate to the existing federal priority under the Insolvency Statute. Id. at 94-95.
In other words, the United States Supreme Court created a standard that private liens must
be choate at the time federal taxes are assessed in order for the private liens to achieve
priority.
In practice, it became nearly impossible for private lienholders to meet this standard
and receive priority under the Insolvency Statute. See, e.g., Gilbert Associates, 345
U.S. at 361 (holding that private creditors could only have choate interests if they had
possession or title to the property prior to the debtor's insolvency); United States v.
Texas, 314 U.S. 480 (1941) (deeming a state tax lien to be inchoate since the property
subject to the lien was not specific, the amount of the claim secured by the lien was
uncertain, and judicial procedure was needed to enforce the lien); New York v. Maclay,
288 U.S. 290 (1933) (denying priority in insolvency to a New York franchise tax lien
where the state tax had not been assessed until after the appointment of receivers, which
signaled the insolvency of the state tax debtor); cf. Vermont, 377 U.S. at 357-58
(describing the absolute priority given to the United States Government under the
Insolvency Statute and ultimately holding that the standard of choateness applied to
solvent debtors was less demanding than that applied to debtors under the Insolvency
Statute).
In the 1940's, the government first began to argue that the choateness rationale
should also be followed in cases not governed by the Insolvency Statute, i.e., cases
involving solvent debtors. Kennedy, supra note 26, at 922-25. While the argument did
not initially succeed, the government finally prevailed with this reasoning in Security
Trust, which extended the choateness doctrine to the law governing federal tax liens for
the first time. Id. at 923-24; Security Trust, 340 U.S. at 51. See infra notes 52-54 and
accompanying text for further discussion of Security Trust.
47. See, e.g., United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 87-88 (1954).
48. See Kennedy, supra note 26, at 911-13. See text accompanying infra notes 55-58
for a current and more complete description of choateness. Unless a private creditor
enjoys "superpriority" status, discussed supra note 39 and accompanying text, its lien
must be choate either (a) before the IRS files notice of its lien (for creditors protected by
the notice filing provision); or (b) before the federal tax lien arises (for creditors not
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has also ruled that while a state's law defines the property subject to its
liens,49 federal law determines whether a state-created lien is choate. 5°
The Supreme Court has repeatedly used the choateness doctrine to
frustrate state-created liens. In the period of 1950 to 1964, the Court
decided most of the seminal lien priority cases and granted priority to
very few state-created liens.5 ' In the first of these cases, United States
v. Security Trust & Savings Bank,52 the Court extended the choateness doctrine beyond Insolvency Statute applications for the first
time.53 Although under prior law a private creditor would have
protected by the notice filing provision) to achieve priority. See infra text accompanying note 62.
49. The Court stated:
[B]oth federal and state courts must look to state law, for it has long been the
rule that "in the application of a federal revenue act, state law controls in
determining the nature of the legal interest which the taxpayer had in the
property ...

sought to be reached by the statute."

Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512-13 (1960) (quoting Morgan v.
Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 82 (1940)).
50. In United States v. Waddill, Holland, & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353, 356 (1945),
landlords of an insolvent tax debtor held a Virginia-created lien that Virginia's Supreme
Court of Appeals deemed as "fixed and specific, and not one which is merely inchoate."
While the United States Supreme Court could not deny that this was a valid pronouncement of Virginia law, and despite having pronounced in Spokane County that specificity
"is really a state question," 279 U.S. at 94, the Court nevertheless restated the role of
state law in determining priority as follows:
[lI]t is a matter of federal law as to whether a lien created by state statute is
sufficiently specific and perfected to raise questions as to the applicability of
the priority given the claims of the United States by an act of Congress ....
A
state court's characterization of a lien as specific and perfected, however
conclusive as a matter of state law, cannot operate by itself to impair or supersede a long-standing Congressional declaration of priority.
Waddill, Holland, & Flinn, 323 U.S. at 356-57. Although the Supreme Court was reluctant to accept the state court's characterization of a lien as choate in Waddill, Holland, &
Flinn, it readily accepted the opposite characterization of another lien less than two
years later: "[I]f the state court itself characterizes the lien as inchoate, this characterization is practically conclusive." Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 371
(1946).
5 1. E.g., United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963); United States v.
R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958); United States v. White Bear Brewing Co.,
350 U.S. 1010 (1956); United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955); United States v.
Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950). For discussion of these cases, see infra
notes 52-62 and accompanying text. One commentator stated that the choateness
doctrine has made the Insolvency Statute "an instrument of oppression." Young, supra
note 36, at 725.
52. 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
53. Id. at 51. In Security Trust, a private creditor held attachment liens on four
parcels of real estate that belonged to a tax debtor. Id. at 48. Before the creditor
obtained a judgment on the debt, the United States filed notice of a federal tax lien. Id.
Because California law provided that a subsequent judgment lien merged with an attachment lien and related back to the time of attachment, the California Court of Appeals
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generally enjoyed priority over a federal tax lien if its lien arose before
the federal tax was assessed, the Security Trust Court added the additional requirement that the private creditor's lien be choate 4
A turn favorable to creditors came in the unanimous United States v.
City of New Britain decision. 5 For the first time, the Court deemed a
state-created lien choate and, therefore, worthy of priority over subsequent federal tax liens on the basis of the "first in time" principle.56
ruled that the private creditor's lien enjoyed priority over the federal tax lien. Id. at 49.
On review, the United States Supreme Court held that the attachment lien was inchoate,
stating: "Numerous contingencies might arise that would prevent the attachment lien
from ever becoming perfected by a judgment awarded and recorded. Thus the attachment
lien is contingent or inchoate .... " Security Trust, 340 U.S. at 50; see also United
States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955) (deeming an attachment lien inchoate because it was
contingent upon the outcome of the underlying suit).
After deeming the attachment lien inchoate, the Court extended the choateness
doctrine to federal tax lien law, reasoning that since inchoate liens lacked priority under
the Insolvency Statute, inchoate liens should also be denied priority over federal tax
liens. Security Trust, 340 U.S. at 51. The Court added: "If the purpose of the federal tax
lien statute to insure prompt and certain collection of taxes due the United States from
tax delinquents is to be fulfilled, a similar rule must prevail here." Id.
54. Kennedy, supra note 44, at 728. Kennedy also observed that Security Trust overruled thirty cases in the lower courts that had denied the priority of the federal tax lien
over prior liens on the basis of the "first in time" principle, which did not take choateness into account. Kennedy, supra note 26, at 924-25 & n. 115.
Security Trust led to a series of decisions defeating garnishment, landlords', attachment, sureties', and mechanics' liens that the Court considered inchoate. See generally
Kennedy, supra note 44, at 729-30 & nn.24-26; Patricia Nassif Fetzer, The Purchase
Money Security Interest and the Federal Tax Lien: A Proposal For Legislative Change,
36 HASTINGS L.J. 873, 888 & n.77 (1985). United States v. White Bear Brewing Co.,
350 U.S. 1010 (1956), is a rather severe example of these decisions. In White Bear, the
Court reversed a Seventh Circuit decision and found a mechanic's lien inchoate, even
though the lien was "specific, prior in time, perfected in the sense that everything
possible under state law had been done to make it choate, and was being enforced before
the federal tax lien arose." Id. at 1010 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
55. 347 U.S. 81 (1954), vacating Brown v. General Laundry Serv., 94 A.2d 10
(Conn. 1952).
56. New Britain, 347 U.S. at 84-85. In New Britain, the Court was confronted with a
common problem: the federal tax lien statute stated that federal liens were inferior to
prior mortgages and judgment liens but superior to New Britain's liens, while
Connecticut law provided that the city's liens were superior to the mortgages and judgment liens. Id. at 83-85; see also Brown, 94 A.2d at 12-13. The Connecticut Supreme
Court of Errors determined that Congress not only intended to subordinate federal liens
to prior mortgages and judgment liens, but also to liens superior to these as well. Id. at
15. Consequently, it gave priority to the city's liens first, followed by the mortgages
and judgment liens, and then the federal liens. Id.
The Court began its analysis by determining that the city's liens were choate and as
binding as-the federal liens. New Britain, 347 U.S. at 84. Departing from other cases
giving federal liens nearly absolute priority under the Insolvency Statute, the Court
observed that the law governing liens against solvent debtors did not provide
"paramount authority" to federal liens. Id. Instead, the Court relied on the Connecticut
Supreme Court's determination regarding the specificity of the city liens, ruling that the
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New Britain announced the seminal test for determining priority of
state-created liens: A state-created lien takes priority over a later
federal tax lien when "there is nothing more to be done to have a
choate lien-when the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the
lien, and the amount of the lien are established., 57 Lienholders were
comforted by the New Britain decision, realizing that if choate, their
liens would enjoy priority over later federal liens. 8
In United States v. PioneerAmerican Insurance Co., 59 the Court
delivered a setback to private lienholders by extending the choateness
doctrine to those liens ostensibly protected from unfiled federal liens
by the notice-filing provision.6 ° The Pioneer Court deemed a
"first in time" principle applied. Id. at 85-86. Although the Court ruled that under the
law controlling liens against solvent debtors a prior choate state lien will have priority
over a later federal lien, it nevertheless vacated the judgment of the Connecticut Supreme
Court and remanded the case for determination of the priority of two competing private
liens. Id. at 88.
57. New Britain, 347 U.S. at 84. New Britain provided justification for applying the
choateness doctrine to protect federal liens. The Court hypothesized that "[otherwise, a
State could affect the standing of federal liens, contrary to the established doctrine,
simply by causing an inchoate lien to attach at some arbitrary time even before the
amount of the tax, assessment, etc., is determined." Id. at 86.
The requirement of choateness should not be confused with the concept of perfection.
While perfection usually requires that a private creditor's lien be filed with an appropriate state authority in order for it to have priority over another private creditor's lien, see
supra note 10, choateness generally requires something more-it requires that there be
no contingencies standing in the way of execution of the lien. See, e.g., Security Trust,
340 U.S. at 50. In Security Trust, an attachment lien, even though filed, was contingent
upon the outcome of an underlying suit. Id.
58. This comfort proved short-lived. Four years later, in United States v. R.F. Ball
Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958), the Court first considered a priority claim pitting a
consensual lien against a federal tax lien. In a baffling per curiam opinion, the Court
reversed a Fifth Circuit ruling, finding an assignment of receivables from a
subcontractor to a surety to be: (1)a mortgage within the meaning of the tax lien
statute; and (2) inchoate and unperfected. Id. at 587. For a later interpretation of Ball,
see Pioneer, 374 U.S. at 89-91.
Although the Court did not explain why the assignment was inchoate, one commentator suggests four potential reasons for the ruling: (1)the surety did not perfect the security interest by filing notice; (2) the surety's lien was not one explicitly protected by
the federal tax lien statute; (3) the assignment covered after-acquired property, and the
sums to be due under the subcontract were uncertain; and (4) the obligation secured by the
surety's lien was contingent and the ultimate amount uncertain (since it depended upon
whether the subcontractor defaulted under its subcontract and the amount needed to cure a
default). Kennedy, supra note 44, at 734-35.
In Pioneer, the Court clarified and relied upon the Ball holding (that the assignment
was an inchoate mortgage). See Pioneer,374 U.S. at 89-91.
59. 374 U.S. 84 (1963).
60. In response, one commentator noted: "It is nevertheless fanciful to attribute to
Congress an intent to adopt a doctrine which had not yet made its first appearance at the
time of the enactment of the original notice-filing provision and which was first applied
to the federal tax lien nearly forty years later." Kennedy, supra note 44, at 731
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mortgagee's prior lien for attorney's fees inchoate, since the ultimate
amount of the attorney's fees was not ascertainable when notice of the
federal lien was filed.6 ' In other words, Pioneer stands for the
proposition that the sole significance of the notice-filing provision is
that it requires that private liens held by creditors protected under the
notice-filing provision be choate on the date notice of the tax lien is
filed, rather than on the date the taxes are assessed.62
After Pioneer,one key question remained unanswered: Whether
private creditors seeking priority over federal tax liens needed to meet
the same choateness standard that they had to meet under the
Insolvency Statute. In United States v. Vermont,63 the Court took the
position that the standard of choateness used under the Insolvency
Statute is more strict than the standard used under federal tax lien
law. 64 Thus, while a federal lien is given nearly absolute priority in
(emphasis added). Kennedy added: "[A]ny suggestion that Congress intended to qualify
the protection afforded mortgagees, pledgees, and judgment creditors by enacting the
doctrine of the inchoate and general lien . . . rests on sheer fiction." Id. at 731 n.32. He
further maintained:
A persuasive reason for not applying the doctrine ... is that the doctrine...
would withdraw protection from most of the persons on the congressionally
prescribed list of beneficiaries of notice-filing. Protection of the judgment
creditor would be particularlydifficult to reconcile with the doctrine .... Even
where a judgment lien is recognized, the lien typically is a general one,
attaching to whatever realty the debtor may then or thereafter own within the
bailiwick of the court rendering the judgment.
Id. at 731-32 (emphasis added).
61. 374 U.S. at 90-9 1. The government nevertheless admitted that its liens were
subordinate to the mortgage principal and interest, since the mortgage agreement was
reached prior to when notice of the tax liens was filed. Id. at 86.
The Court agreed with the government and held that mortgagees were subject to the
choateness doctrine, stating it "has never held that mortgagees face a less demanding
test of [choateness] . . . than other interests when competing with the federal lien."
Pioneer, 374 U.S. at 89-90. The Court then concluded that the claim for attorney's fees
was inchoate at the time the tax liens were filed and, therefore, was subordinate to the
federal liens. Id. at 90-92.
62. Plumb, supra note 23, at 231 n.26.
63. 377 U.S. 351 (1964).
64. Id. at 358. Compare United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361 (1953)
(ruling that under the Insolvency Statute a private lien is inchoate until the creditor takes
possession of or title to the subject property) with New Britain, 347 U.S. at 84 (ruling
that a state lien against a solvent debtor was choate because "the identity of the lienor,
the property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien [were) established"). See
supra note 46 for a discussion of the strict standard of choateness used in cases decided
under the Insolvency Statute. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text for further
discussion of New Britain, the first case decided under the existing tax lien statute to find
a competing private lien choate. Because of the different standards applied to solvent
and insolvent debtors, a private lien that is competing with a federal tax lien may be
judged under a more stringent choateness standard if the debtor becomes insolvent.
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Statute, such priority is not automatic
cases under the Insolvency
65
under federal tax lien law.
The Vermont Court upheld the priority of a Vermont tax lien over a
later federal lien, even though both liens attached to all the debtor's
property. 66 The Court rejected an argument that would later play a key
role in McDermott: that a prior state lien must attach "to specifically
identified portions of [the taxpayer's] ...property" in order to be
choate. 67 The Vermont Court concluded that a lien attaching "to all the
taxpayer's property" was choate.68
Overall, the choateness doctrine severely diminished the creditor
protection rooted in the "first in time" principle. Until the ascent of the
choateness doctrine beginning in 1950, the power of the federal tax
lien as a weapon for tax enforcement had been balanced by measures
65. The Vermont Court also resolved another issue: whether a state-created lien,
worded almost identically to a federal tax lien, can be inchoate. The Court reviewed its
decision in New Britain, in which it upheld state-created liens on the basis that they were
just as valid as the federal tax lien. Vermont, 377 U.S. at 355 (citing New Britain, 347
U.S. at 84). On this basis, the Vermont Court concluded, such a state-created lien would
have to be choate. Id. at 358.
66. Vermont, 377 U.S. at 352-59. The State of Vermont had enacted a tax lien statute
virtually identical to the existing federal statute. Id. at 352. On October 21, 1958, the
state assessed a debtor for withheld state income taxes, which, according to the Vermont
statute, placed a lien on all the debtor's assets lasting until the liability was satisfied.
Id. More than three months after the state assessment, the IRS assessed the debtor for
unpaid unemployment taxes. Id. at 353. Shortly thereafter, the state sued and won a
judgment against the debtor, joining as a defendant a bank in which the debtor had
deposited funds. Id. The federal government later brought an action, which was the
subject of Vermont, to foreclose its lien against the debtor's bank accounts and establish priority over the state lien. Vermont, 377 U.S. at 353-54.
The Supreme Court considered the Vermont liens choate on the basis that there was
"nothing more to be done to have a choate lien . .. the identity of the lienor, the
property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien [were] established." Id. at 355
(quoting New Britain, 347 U.S. at 84).
Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart provided further insight:
[U]nlike those cases in which the Security Trust rationale was applied to
subordinate liens on the ground that judgment had not been obtained prior to
the time the federal lien arose, it is as true of Vermont's lien here as it was true
of the federal lien in New Britain that "[lthe assessment is given the force of a
judgment, and if the amount assessed is not paid when due, administrative
officials may seize the debtor's property to satisfy the debt."
Vermont, 377 U.S. at 358-59 (quoting Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 260 (1935))
(footnotes omitted).
67. Vermont, 377 U.S. at 355. See infra notes 127, 156 and accompanying text for
discussion of treatments of this argument by the McDermott majority and dissent.
68. Vermont, 377 U.S. at 355. See also Wisconsin v. Bar Coat Blacktop, Inc., 640
F. Supp. 407, 414 (W.D. Wis. 1986) (reasoning that Vermont stands for the proposition
that a state lien directed to all of a taxpayer's property, rather than to specific portions
of property, is not necessarily inchoate).
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providing equity and relief to certain nonfederal creditors. 69 While the
pre-1950 view had been that to gain priority a private lien need only be
"first in time," the Court's new doctrine added the hurdle that the lien
need also be choate.7°
C. The Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966
As the choateness doctrine was applied to federal tax liens on
solvent debtors during the 1950s, the practices of commercial finance
were changing as well. During this period, it became common to
secure financing agreements with forms of after-acquired property
such as future accounts receivable, inventory, and rights under longterm contracts. 7' At the same time, states throughout the country
adopted the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."), and with this
statutory boost, "floating lien ' 72 financing became increasingly
widespread.7 3 The commercial community was soon troubled, however, when these methods of financing began to fall victim to the
choateness doctrine, 74 since creditors competed for after-acquired
property with federal tax liens.75
Recognizing that the confusing new judicial concept of choateness
was undermining the financing methods fostered by the U.C.C.,
76
Congress enacted the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 ("FTLA"),
which was incorporated into the Internal Revenue Code as sections
6321 through 6323 and has since remained largely unchanged.77
69. See supra part II.A.
70. See text accompanying supra notes 51-62.
7 1. For discussion of the changes in financing, see generally Coogan, supra note 43,
at 1376-77; Fetzer, supra note 54, at 874-86; Robert Peace, Choateness and Lien
Priority: Private Lien Creditors vs. the IRS, 106 BANKING L.J. 157, 158 (1989); Olivia
F. Gallo, Comment, Conflict Between the Uniform Commercial Code and the Federal Tax
Lien Act, 7 WHITTER L. REV. 1009, 1009-26 (1985).
72. A debtor's providing a security interest in its after-acquired property means that
the creditor's interest attaches immediately whenever the debtor acquires new property;
in a sense, the security interest "floats" over the debtor's estate. See Nickles, supra note
10, at 1140-41. Thus, an interest in after-acquired property is often termed a "floating
lien." Id.
73. Fetzer, supra note 54, at 877, 888; Peace, supra note 71, at 158.
74. Michael St. James, Federal Tax Liens-Making Bankruptcy Attractive to
Creditors, 46 Bus. LAW. 157, 159 (1990). Since floating lien financing was based upon
an amorphous, constantly changing collateral and often secured a fluctuating debt, it
soon became common for these liens to be subordinated to federal tax liens. Coogan,
supra note 43, at 1377.
75. See, e.g., Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945) (holding that
the federal tax lien burdened a tax debtor's after-acquired property).
76. Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (1966).
77. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321, 6322, 6323 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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While Congress did not adopt the full extent of private creditor protection recommended by the American Bar Association, 8 it nevertheless
enacted the FTLA based on considerations of equity79 and designed it
to conform tax lien law to U.C.C. concepts.'
The FTLA both modified the federal tax lien's position vis-a-vis
state liens with respect to the choateness doctrine and the "first in time"
principle and recognized the priority of many state liens over federal
liens.8' Still, in many respects, the FTLA merely constituted a repackaging and restatement of existing law. For instance, sections 6321 and
6322 of the federal tax code, which had previously established the
federal lien and specified its duration, remained largely unchanged. 82
A major goal behind the FTLA was to conform federal law to the
commercial transactions governed by the U.C.C. The FTLA
attempted to accomplish this in at least two ways. First, it expanded
the superpriority provisions now codified in section 6323(b). 3
Second, it provided specific protection for certain "commercial transactions financing agreements," including agreements creating security
interests in after-acquired property."
78. See Fetzer, supra note 54, at 874; Peace, supra note 71, at 157.
79. Hencke, supra note 25, at 753.
80. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1966). This House Report, which
accompanied the bill that became the FTLA, stated:
Since the adoption of the Federal income tax in 1913, the nature of commercial financial transactions has changed appreciably. Business practices have
been substantially revised and, as a result, many new types of secured transactions have been developed. . . . [In addition,] [u]nder the [Uniform]
Commercial Code, priority now is afforded new types of commercial secured
creditors not previously protected.
This bill is in part an attempt to conform the lien provisions of the internal
revenue laws to the concepts developed in this Uniform Commercial Code.
Id.
81. United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715, 738 (1979).
82. Young, supra note 36, at 724; Fed. Tax Coordinator, supra note 37, at 55,108.
See supra notes 11-12 for the text of these sections.
83. Peace, supra note 71, at 162-63. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text
for discussion of the previous superpriority provisions. Superpriority-the priority
granted to state interests over all federal liens-was extended under the FTLA to eight
new areas of interests: (1) personal property purchased at retail; (2) personal property
purchased in casual sale; (3) personal property subject to possessory lien; (4) real
property tax and special assessment liens; (5) residential property subject to a mechanic's lien for certain repairs and improvements; (6) attorney's liens; (7) certain insurance
contracts; and (8) passbook loans. Peace, supra note 71, at 162-63; Fed. Tax
Coordinator, supra note 37, at 55,108-09.
84. Peace, supra note 71, at 163. According to Peace:
In general, this provision states that a filed federal tax lien is inferior to a
security interest that comes into existence after the tax lien filing if the subsequent security interest is in qualified property and the interest is created with a
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For traditional judgment lien creditors, however, the FTLA
amendments did not alter the status quo established by the "first in
time" principle and the notice-filing provision.85 Still, the FTLA reinforced protections already enjoyed by judgment creditors, and with the
commercial transactions financing agreement....
' * ' The term "qualified property" includes only commercial financing
security acquired by the taxpayer within forty-five days after the date of a tax
lien filing.
Id. (emphasis added). A "commercial transactions financing agreement" is defined in
§ 6323(c)(2)(A) as an agreement (i) to make loans to the taxpayer to be secured by
"commercial financing security" (either commercial paper, receivables, mortgages, or
inventory) acquired by the taxpayer or (ii) to purchase commercial financing security
(other than inventory). 26 U.S.C. § 6323(c)(2) (1988). This provision was the principal measure adopted under the FTLA to conform with the U.C.C. For further discussion
of the effects of this provision, see generally Fetzer, supra note 54; PLUMB, supra note
22 (highlighting the casual sale superpriority provision); Coogan, supra note 43;
Nickles, supra note 10; Gallo, supra note 71.
Furthermore, while purchasers and judgment creditors remained protected under the
notice-filing provision of section 6323(a), pledgees and mortgagees were replaced by
mechanic's lienors and "holder[s] of a security interest" as protected parties. 26 U.S.C.
§ 6323(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). A "security interest" is defined as follows:
The term "security interest" means any interest in property acquired by
contract for the purpose of securing payment or performance of an obligation
or indemnifying against loss or liability. A security interest exists at any
time (A) if, at such time, the property is in existence and the interest has
become protected under local law against a subsequent judgment lien arising
out of an unsecured obligation, and (B) to the extent that, at such time, the
holder has parted with money or money's worth.
26 U.S.C. § 6323(h)(1) (1988). Under this definition, notice-filing protection would
exist for a typical home mortgage, auto loan, or other lending arrangement secured by
property in the possession of the debtor.
85. The FTLA's addition of security interest holders as a protected class and protection of "commercial transaction financing agreements" provided priority to the afteracquired property interests mainly held by commercial, consensual lienors, rather than
the traditional judgment creditor involved in McDermott.
Most FTLA-prompted litigation has involved attempts to classify consensual security
arrangements as falling within the protection of the FTLA-litigation that is not
relevant to the focus of this Note. See, e.g., Southern Rock, Inc. v. B & B Auto Supply,
711 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1983) (rejecting an attempt to classify an assignment of receivables within § 6323(c)(1)); Rice Investment Company v. United States, 625 F.2d 565
(5th Cir. 1980) (rejecting an attempt to classify a security interest in after-acquired
inventory within § 6323(c) on the basis that the inventory was not "qualified
property"); Sgro v. United States, 609 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1979) (rejecting an attempt
to classify a security arrangement under § 6323(c) where the agreement was not one to
make loans and where it was entered in the course of trade or business).
Still, the FTLA has generated an issue with some relevance to this Note, that being the
issue of when a security interest in after-acquired property has been acquired and attached.
See Peace, supra note 71, at 163-72 for further discussion of this area. Most decisions
on this issue, however, deal with consensual security agreements based on commercial
lending arrangements. Those decisions are thus not directly related to McDermott,
which dealt instead with after-acquired property subject to a nonconsensual judgment
lien.
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FTLA, Congress, for the first time, provided specific protection to
creditors having a security interest in after-acquired property. The
FTLA also codified the "first in time" principle and reaffirmed both the
notice-filing provision and the choateness doctrine as it applied to
judgment creditors.8 6
III. DISCUSSION

When the Supreme Court granted certiorari 7 in United States v.
McDermott, it undertook to rule on the priority of a federal tax lien
against a nonconsensual, state-created lien for the first time since the
enactment of the FTLA. The McDermott Court addressed questions
raised by competing claims of a federal tax lien and a private creditor's
judgment lien on a debtor's after-acquired property.'
A. McDermott: The Factsand Lower Court Opinions
In 1981, Bruce and Betty McDermott contracted to sell real estate
(the "South Street property" or "the property") located in Salt Lake
City, Utah.89 Under the terms of the contract, the buyers gave the
McDermotts $191,000 in cash and $146,000 in a note to be paid in
monthly installments. 9° To secure the note, the buyers also issued a
Trust Deed on the South Street property, conveying their interest to a
trustee. 9' Under the terms of the sale, the McDermotts were to retain
legal title to the South Street property until the buyers made their final
payment.92
86. The House report accompanying the bill that became the FTLA acknowledged the
choateness doctrine in the following passage:
Under decisions of the Supreme Court a mortgagee, pledgee, or judgment creditor is protected at the time notice of the tax lien is filed if the identity of the
lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien are all
established at such time. . . . [Slubsection (a) of new section 6323 retains this
basic rule of Federal law.
H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1966). Furthermore, in Kimbell Foods,
the Court reasserted that the choateness doctrine must still be applied to state-created
liens. 440 U.S. at 720-21.
87. 112 S. Ct. 2272 (1992).
88. United States v. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. 1526, 1530-31 (1993).
89. Brief for Petitioner at 2, United States v. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. 1526 (1993)
(No. 91-1229).
90. McDermott v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, N.A., 945 F.2d *1475, 1477 (10th Cir.
1991) [hereinafter Zions].
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1477-78 & n.4. In an installment land sale contract, the vendors (here the
McDermotts) retain legal title to the property as security for the purchase price. Butler
v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1254 (Utah 1987). The title serves as the basis for
forfeiting the buyer's interest and retaking possession of the property in the case of
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On December 9, 1986, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
assessed the McDermotts for unpaid federal taxes due from the years
1977 through 1981. 9' This assessment created a lien in favor of the
United States on all the McDermotts' property, 94 including afteracquired property. 95 The IRS, however, did not file notice of the tax
lien in Salt Lake County until September 9, 1987.96 In the meantime,
on June 22, 1987, Zions First National Bank (the "Bank") obtained a
$67,977.67 state court judgment against the McDermotts, which it
docketed with the Salt Lake County Clerk on July 6, 1987. 97 Under
Utah law, this created a judgment lien on all the McDermotts' real
property in Salt Lake County, including after-acquired property.98
When the buyers defaulted on their note, the McDermotts began
foreclosure proceedings on the South Street property and eventually
repurchased the property at a trustee's sale on September 23, 1987, 99
two weeks after the IRS filed notice of its lien and two months after
the Bank docketed its judgment.'0° There is no evidence that either the
IRS or the Bank had attempted to execute its lien prior to this time."0 '
To facilitate the sale of the South Street property to a third party, the
McDermotts, the IRS, and the Bank entered into an escrow agreement

default. Cannefax v. Clement, 818 P.2d 546, 549 (Utah 1991). Additionally, the interest may be sold or mortgaged based upon the amount the buyer owes under the contract.
Butler, 740 P.2d at 1255.
This interest of the vendor has been called "bare" or "naked" legal title. Cannefax,
818 P.2d at 549. Under the doctrine of equitable conversion, the buyer obtains an
equitable interest in the land even though he does not yet have legal title. Butler, 740
P.2d at 1255 n.5. Furthermore, the buyer is treated as the owner of the land and "may
mortgage his or her equity in the land, assign it to a third party as security for a loan, or
sell the interest by way of an assignment." Id. at 1254 (citations omitted); see also Lach
v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (stating that the buyer is
"thereafter treated as the owner of the land").
93. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1527.
94. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321, 6322 (1988). See supra note I1 for the text of § 6321, and
supra note 12 for the text of § 6322.
95. Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265, 267 (1945); Wisconsin v. Bar
Coat Blacktop, 640 F. Supp. 407, 412 (W.D. Wis. 1986).
96. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1527.
97. Brief for Respondent at 3, United States v. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. 1526 (1993)
(No. 91-1229). The Bank's judgment arose out of litigation regarding a defaulted
promissory note the McDermotts issued to the Bank guaranteeing repayment of a loan
independent of, and irrelevant to, the South Street property. Zions First Nat'l Bank,
N.A. v. McDermott, No. C86-09140 (3d Jud. Dist. Ct. Salt Lake County June 22, 1987).
98. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22-1 (1992). See supra note 7 for the text of this statute.
99.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 97, at 3.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
101. Zions, 945 F.2d at 1477.
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(the "Agreement").'0 2 The Agreement provided that the IRS and the
Bank released their claims on the South Street property, but reserved
their rights to the cash proceeds of the sale of the property based upon
the priorities of their liens at the time the McDermotts reacquired the
property.'0 3 Pursuant to the Agreement, the McDermotts initiated an
interpleader action in state court and deposited $135,575.50, the net
proceeds of the sale of the South Street property."
The IRS removed the case to the United States District Court for the
District of Utah. 5 Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment,
the district court concluded that both liens simultaneously attached to
the South Street property at the time the McDermotts reacquired it.'" 6
The court also determined that under the Agreement, the IRS waived
all claims it may have had on any "personalty" interest retained by the
McDermotts under the real estate contract conveying the South Street
property to the buyers. 0 7 Applying the common law rule of "first in
time, first in right,"' 0 8 the district court held that the Bank's judgment
lien had priority over the IRS lien because it was docketed before the
IRS filed its notice. 1' 9
The Tenth Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court's
decision, although it did so on different grounds. " 0 It agreed with the
district court's conclusion that the Bank and the IRS had intended, by
102. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1527-28.
103. Id. The March 4, 1988 Agreement contained the following pertinent language:
It is understood that the releases delivered herewith by the IRS and Zions are
unconditional. The monies placed in escrow shall be in lieu of all legal or
equitable rights of the IRS and Zions to the real property released by them as
part of this agreement. Neither party hereto waives any rights, defenses, and
claims that they may have had or any of them may have had in any interest in
and to the real property, such rights being reserved and shall apply to the cash
proceeds being held in escrow in substitution of the subject real property. The
respective priorities of the parties to the cash proceeds shall be identical to
the priorities of the respective liens of the parties as they existed against the
real property as of September 23, 1987, after Bruce J. McDermott successfully
bid and purchased the property at the Trustee's Sale, notwithstanding the
change in form of collateral.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 97, at 4.
104. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 89, at 3.
105. McDermott, 113 S.Ct. at 1528.
106. Zions, 945 F.2d at 1478.
107. Id. See supra note 103 for the Agreement provisions examined by the district
court.
108. See supra note 9, citing Rankin & Schatzell, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 179 ("The
principle is believed to be universal, that a prior lien gives a prior claim, which is
entitled to prior satisfaction ....").
109. Zions, 945 F.2d at 1478.
110. Id. at 1475.
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the Agreement, that their liens would attach to the South Street property. " While the issue of whether the McDermotts had rights in the
South Street property to which the federal lien could attach would
normally be resolved under Utah law," 2 the Tenth Circuit declared that
the IRS and the Bank had made state law inapplicable by implicitly
recognizing in the Agreement that their liens would attach to the
McDermotts' real property interest in the South Street property." 3 The
court then reiterated that federal
4 law governs priority among federal tax
liens and state-created liens."
Citing the choateness test from New Britain,"5 the Tenth Circuit
reasoned that under Vermont, if a creditor perfects a lien on all of a
debtor's real property before the federal government provides notice of
111. Id. at 1478-79. The Tenth Circuit also noted that at the time of the district court
decision, "it was not clear in Utah whether or not a judgment lien could attach to a
vendor's interest in a real estate contract." Id. at 1479 n.5. The court further noted that
in 1990, a Utah Court of Appeals decision held that a vendor had no such property rights
to which a lien could attach. Id. (citing Cannefax, 786 P.2d 1377). Other states take the
contrary view. E.g. Mooring v. Brown, 763 F.2d 386 (10th Cir. 1985) (applying
Colorado law); First Sec. Bank v. Rogers, 429 P.2d 386 (Idaho 1967); May v. Emerson,
96 P. 454 (Or. 1908); Heath v. Dodson, 110 P.2d 845 (Wash. 1941).
The Cannefax decision was later affirmed by the Supreme Court of Utah. Cannefax,
818 P.2d 546 (Utah 1991), aff'g 786 P.2d 1377 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In doing so, the
Utah Supreme Court stated that "the mere retention of title of land subject to a land sale
contract does not amount to ownership of real property for purposes of [UTAH CODE
ANN.] § 78-22-1 [1953]." 818 P.2d at 550.
This distinction is critical. If the McDermotts had an interest before the foreclosure to
which the Bank's judgment lien could attach, then arguably the Bank's lien had attached
to the McDermotts interest when it was created on July 6--two months prior to the IRS's
Notice of Tax Lien. Since "[tihe lien imposed by section 6321 [establishing federal tax
liens] shall not be valid as against any . . .judgment lien creditor until notice thereof
...has been filed," 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (emphasis added), this
would have given priority to the Bank's lien.
The Tenth Circuit also noted that the federal tax lien may have attached to the
McDermotts' beneficial interest, but that the IRS had not argued this point. Zions, 945
F.2d at 1479 n.5. In this respect, it is important to note that while a Utah judgment lien
can only attach to the real property interests of a debtor, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22-1, a
federal tax lien can attach to either the real or personal interests of the debtor. 26 U.S.C.
§ 6321. Implicit in the district court and Tenth Circuit's decisions is the conclusion that
the Agreement waived the IRS's interest in the personalty aspect of the contract that
conveyed the South Street property to the original purchasers. See supra notes 103,
107, infra note 113 and accompanying text. The IRS disputed this conclusion in the
Supreme Court. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 89, at 4 n.2. However, the Court did
not address the issue.
112. Zions, 945 F.2d at 1479 (citing Aquilino, 363 U.S. at 512-13).
113. Id; see also supra notes 103, 108.
114. Zions, 945 F.2d at 1479 (citing United States v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y,
384 U.S. 323, 328 (1966)).
115. The lien must be "perfected in the sense that there is nothing more to be done to
have a choate lien .... New Britain, 347 U.S. at 84.
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its tax lien, the creditor's lien takes priority, even with respect to property acquired after both liens arose. 16 The court then concluded that
since the Bank's lien, like the lien in Vermont, was noncontingent,
specific in amount, and fully enforceable once docketed, it was entitled
to priority over the later-filed IRS lien." 7
B. The Opinion of the Supreme Court
In a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth
Circuit." 8 Although the majority and dissent agreed that the guidance
provided by the relevant statutes and precedents was unclear," 9 they
did not agree on whether the Bank's lien was choate at the time the
IRS filed notice. The majority observed that although the IRS's lien
attached when the McDermotts reacquired the South Street property,
the lien became valid against the Bank's lien on the date the IRS filed
notice. 20 The majority then concluded that the Bank's lien did not
become choate until it attached to the South Street property when the
McDermotts reacquired it, and since that occurred after the IRS filed
notice, the IRS had priority. 2. In contrast, the dissent concluded that
the Bank's lien became choate when the Bank docketed and filed22 its
judgment against the McDermotts with the clerk of the state court.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia reaffirmed the propositions
that federal tax liens do not enjoy automatic priority, and that unless
otherwise provided by statute, the common law rule of "first in time is
first in right" applies. 21 3 He then opined that according to the current
notice-filing provision, the IRS's lien could not have gained priority
over the Bank's lien under any circumstances until the IRS filed
notice.124 Accordingly, Justice Scalia examined whether, under the
dictates of New Britain, the Bank's lien was choate before the IRS
116. Zions, 945 F.2d at 1480.
117. Id. at 1481. For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit ruling, see James Serven,
Taxation, 69 DENV. U. L. REV. 1037, 1076-80 (1992).
118. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1526. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun, Kennedy, and
Souter joined. Id. Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stevens
and O'Connor joined. Id.
119. See McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1531 ("[Wie would hardly proclaim the statutory
meaning we have discerned in this opinion to be 'clear."'); id. at 1534 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("[Olur precedents do not provide the clearest answer to the question.").
120. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1530.
121. Id. at 1529-30.
122. Id. at 1532.
123. Id. at 1528 (citing New Britain, 347 U.S. at 85; Rankin & Schatzell, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) at 179).
124. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1528.
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filed notice.' 25
The New Britaincriterion most at issue in McDermott was whether
the property subject to the Bank's lien was sufficiently established for
the lien to be considered choate. In this regard, Justice Scalia first
criticized the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that Vermont established that a
noncontingent, state-created lien on all of a debtor's real property will
take priority over a federal lien regardless of whether the state-created
lien covers after-acquired property. 26 According to Justice Scalia, the
Vermont Court merely concluded that a state-created lien on all of a
debtor's property need not attach to specifically identified portions of
the debtor's property to be choate. 27 He stressed that Vermont left
open the precise question presented in McDermott: whether a lien on
after-acquired
property can ever be choate under the New Britain
28
criteria.
In the pivotal point of the McDermott decision, Justice Scalia
announced that the Bank's lien did not become choate until it attached
to the South Street property at the time the McDermotts reacquired
it.129 Accordingly, he rejected the argument that because the Bank,
after docketing its judgment, did not need to do anything further to
make its lien enforceable against the after-acquired property, the
Bank's lien became choate at the point of docketing. 30 Justice Scalia
analogized that under the U.C.C., a security interest in after-acquired
3
property is not perfected when a creditor files a financing statement1 '
125. Justice Scalia quoted the New Britain Court's statement that for a lien to be
perfected, "'the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of
the lien [must be] established."' Id. (quoting New Britain, 347 U.S. at 84) (emphasis
omitted).
126. McDermott, 113 S.Ct. at 1528. See supra text accompanying note 116 for
discussion of the Tenth Circuit's reading of Vermont.
127. Justice Scalia stated that the critical argument rejected in Vermont was not that:
[T]he State's claim could not be superior unless [the property claimed by the
State and federal government] had been "specifically identified" as property
subject to the State's lien, but rather that the State's claim could not be
superior unless it had "attach[ed] to specifically identified portions of that
property."
McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1528-29 n.2 (citation omitted) (alteration in original).
128. Id. at 1529 ("We did not consider, and the facts as recited did not implicate, the
quite different argument made by the United States in the present case: that a lien in
after-acquired property is not 'perfected' as to property yet to be acquired").
129. Id. at 1529-30.
130. Id. at 1529. According to the majority, this argument misconstrued the New
Britain requirement that for perfection, "nothing more [had] to be done to have a choate
lien," New Britain, 347 U.S. at 84, adding that the argument "would simply have us
substitute the concept of 'best efforts' for the concept of perfection." McDermott, 113
S. Ct. at 1529 n.4.
13 1. A financing statement is a document that is signed by the debtor and names the
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but rather when the interest attaches to a specific piece of property
upon acquisition. 3 2 Accordingly, Justice Scalia concluded, the
Bank's lien did not become choate until the McDermotts reacquired the
South Street property, because only then could "the property subject to
the lien" be established within the New Britain criteria. 33 Noting that
the Bank conceded that its lien did not attach to the South Street
property until the McDermotts reacquired it, 34 Justice Scalia concluded that the Bank's state-created lien was not "first in time" because
at the35 time of reacquisition, the IRS had already filed notice of its
1
lien.

Justice Scalia then focused on the priority enjoyed by federal tax
liens. Although he acknowledged that both the Bank's lien and the
IRS's lien relied on after-acquired property provisions to attach simultaneously to the South Street property, 136 Justice Scalia determined that
under section 6323(a) of the federal tax code, the IRS's filing of notice
rendered its lien valid for "first in time" purposes. 137 Unlike the
Bank's judgment lien, Justice Scalia maintained, a filed tax lien is valid
38
regardless of whether it has attached to a specific piece of property.
debtor and secured party, provides their addresses, and gives a description of the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-402(1), 3A U.L.A. 546 (1992); see supra note 10 for further discussion
of financing statements.
132. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1529 (citing U.C.C. § 9-203, 3 U.L.A. 363 (1992);
U.C.C. § 9-303(1), 3A U.L.A. 117 (1992)).
133. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1529-30 n.5. Justice Scalia emphasized the
"unavoidable realities that the property subject to a lien is not 'established' Until one
knows what specific property that is, and that a lien cannot be anything other than
'inchoate' with respect to property that is not yet subject to the lien." Id. He further
urged:
[H]ow could [the judgment lien] have been at th[e] time [it was created]
"definite" as to this property, when the identity of this property ...was yet
unknown? Or "noncontingent" as to this property, when the property would
have remained entirely free of the judgment lien had the McDermotts not later
decided to buy it? Or "summarily enforceable" against this property when the
McDermotts did not own, and had never owned, it?... [O]f course it was not
"immediately enforceable" ... against property that the McDermotts had not
yet acquired.
Id.
134. Id. at 1529-30 (citing Brief for Respondent, supra note 97, at 16, 21). It should
be noted that the Bank's brief did not merely state that "its lien did not actually attach to
the property at issue here until the McDermotts acquired rights in that property" as
quoted by the Court, McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1530, but stated that at that time, both
liens "simultaneously attached specifically to the Property." Brief for Respondent,
supra note 97, at 16 (emphasis added).
135. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1530.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. ("We think ... that under the language of § 6323(a) ...the filing of notice
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Justice Scalia concluded by addressing the fairness of the Court's
ruling. Responding to the argument that the common law rule of "first
in time" should apply unless a lien-creating statute clearly manifests a
contrary intent,13 he conceded that such a rule might be appropriate
where simultaneously perfected liens arise out of voluntary transactions-but not in the situation posed by McDermott.'40 To illustrate,
he drew a scenario in which two succeeding private lenders with notice
rely on after-acquired property as security. 4 ' In such circumstances,
Justice Scalia reasoned, the second lender, knowing of the first
lender's prior claim, can make an informed choice of whether or not to
extend credit.'42 In contrast, Justice Scalia maintained, the IRS does
not have a similar choice; it must assess and collect taxes from all
taxpayers, regardless of any previously filed security agreements that
encumber the taxpayers.143 He also urged that the "first to file"
presumption the Bank advocated is inapposite under the tax statutes,
which generally give the IRS priority even if it never files notice'"
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Writing for the dissent, Justice Thomas agreed that under the noticefiling provision, the date the IRS files notice determines a federal tax
lien's priority. 45 He argued, however, that the key criterion under
New Britain is whether the private lien was perfected on the filing
date, in the sense that there was nothing more to be done for it to
become choate.' 46 In Justice Thomas's opinion, the Bank's lien
would have achieved choateness under this criterion if the property
subject to the lien were sufficiently established at the time the IRS filed

renders the federal tax lien extant for 'first in time' priority purposes regardless of
whether it has yet attached to identifiable property.").
139. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1530 (citing Brief for Respondent, supra note 97, at
1l).
140. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1530-31.
141. Id. at 1531.
142. Id. Justice Scalia reasoned:
When two private lenders both exact from the same debtor security agreements
with after-acquired-property clauses, the second lender knows, by reason of the
earlier recording, that that category of property will be subject to another
claim, and if the remaining security is inadequate he may avoid the difficulty
by declining to extend credit.
Id.
143. McDermott, 113 S.Ct. at 1531.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1531 (Thomas, J.,dissenting).
146. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing New Britain, 347 U.S. at 84).
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its notice. 47 He concluded that precedent established that a lien on
after-acquired property
may be choate before the debtor acquires rights
48
in the property.
According to Justice Thomas, the proper focus for determining
whether property is sufficiently established is "whether the lien is free
from 'contingencies' that stand in the way of its execution.' ' 49 For
example, notwithstanding the fact that the state-created lien in Vermont
did not attach to a specific piece of property, Justice Thomas urged,
the Court granted it priority since it was "'summarily enforceable'
upon assessment and demand."'' 50 Justice Thomas further recognized
that although priority under the notice-filing provision is a federal
question, state law must be consulted to resolve the question.' 5' He
emphasized that under Utah law, the Bank's lien was noncontingent,
definite to the type of property, and immediately enforceable upon the
debtor's acquisition of the property.'52 Justice Thomas maintained that
because the Bank's lien had reached this stage of certainty, nothing
else needed to be done for the lien to become choate, and the Bank was
thus entitled to priority over the later-filed federal tax lien." 3
147. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1531 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing New Britain,
374 U.S. at 84).
148. Id. at 1531 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas argued that the Bank's
lien was "definite as to the property in question, noncontingent, and summarily enforceable," id. at 1532, and, therefore, had "'acquired sufficient substance and ha[d] become so
perfected,' with respect to the McDermotts' after-acquired real property, 'as to defeat
[the] later-filed federal tax lien."' Id. at 1531 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Pioneer,
374 U.S. at 88) (alteration in original).
149. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1531-32 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Security
Trust, 340 U.S. at 50).
150. Id. at 1532 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Vermont, 377 U.S. at 359 & n.12).
In contrast, Justice Thomas reasoned, the lien at issue in Security Trust was not given
priority since it required that steps be taken to make it enforceable. Id. at 1532
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
15 1. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Although the choateness of a state-law lien under
§ 6323(a) is a federal question, that question is answered in part by reference to state law,
and we therefore give due weight to the State's 'classification of [its] lien as specific and
perfected."') (citing Pioneer, 374 U.S. at 88 n.7; Security Trust, 340 U.S. at 49)
(alteration in original).
152. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1532 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Belnap v.
Blain, 575 P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1978); UTAH R. Civ. P. 69). Justice Thomas also
observed that "[niothing in the law . . . suggests that the possibility . . . that the
McDermotts would not acquire the [South Street property] was a 'contingency' that
rendered the' Bank's otherwise perfected general judgment lien subordinate to intervening liens." Id. at 1533 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He further noted that the Bank's lien
was "'not subject to alteration by a court on equitable grounds."' Id. at 1532 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (quoting Taylor Nat'l, Inc. v. Jensen Bros. Constr. Co., 641 P.2d 150,
155 (Utah 1982)).
153. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1534 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

1994]

United States v. McDermott

431

Justice Thomas took issue with the Court's attempt to distinguish
Vermont, stating that the argument of the government rejected in
Vermont was "analytically indistinguishable" from the argument the
Court accepted in McDermott.154 He reasoned that in Vermont, the
155
state lien applied to all property rights, whenever acquired.'
Furthermore, according to Justice Thomas, the Vermont Court rejected
the argument that the state lien could not have priority unless it
"specifically identified" the bank account in question as subject to the
lien.'56 Therefore, Justice Thomas argued, the acquisition of a specific57
piece of property should not be a requirement for a lien to be choate.'
Although at the time the IRS filed its notice it may have been uncertain
154. Id. at 1532-33 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice Thomas noted:
The Department of Treasury regulations defining "judgment lien creditor" for
purposes of § 6323(a) set forth only three specific requirements for a choate
lien (corresponding to the three "establish[ment]" criteria of New Britain).
The judgment creditor must "obtai[n] a valid judgment" (thus establishing the
lienor) for the recovery of "specifically designated property or for a certain
sum of money" (thus establishing the amount of the lien), and if recording or
docketing is "necessary under local law" for the lien to be effective against
third parties, the judgment lien "is not perfected with respect to real property
until the time of such recordation or docketing." The last requirement-recording or docketing-is the only specific requirement recognized in the regulations for establishing the real property subject to the judgment lien. The
regulations in no way suggest that § 6323(a) imposes any "attachment" condition for after-acquired property. Such a condition would be, in effect, an
additional recordation requirement that is not otherwise imposed by local law.
Id. at 1532 n.l (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing 26 C.F.R. § 301.6323(h)-l(g) (1992)).
Justice Scalia responded that the regulation also says that to have priority, a judgment
lien must be choate, which does not occur "'until the identity of the lienor, the property
subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien are established."' Id. at 1530 n.6 (quoting
26 C.F.R. § 301.6323(h)-l(g)) (emphasis added).
155. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1533 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 1533 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In contrast, Justice Scalia opined that
the failed argument was not that the property be identified as subject to the state lien, but
that the lien must attach to specifically identified portions of the property. See supra
notes 126-28 and accompanying text (further discussing Justice Scalia's position).
Justice Thomas argued that the majority's reasoning, like the Government's failed
argument in Vermont, partly relied on dicta in New Britain that "'attachment to specific
property [is] a condition for choateness of a State-created lien."' McDermott, 113 S. Ct.
at 1533 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for United States at 19, United States v.
Vermont, 375 U.S. 940 (1963) (No. 509)) (alteration in original). He explained the
failure of both arguments by pointing out that New Britain, Security Trust, and "all of
our cases before Vermont" involved two liens that had attached to the same property and
"provided no occasion to consider the necessity of attachment to property that was not
specifically identified at the time the state lien arose." Id. at 1533 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
157. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1533 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("If specific attachment is not required for the state lien to be 'sufficiently choate' . . . then neither is
specific acquisition.").
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whether the McDermotts would specifically reacquire the South Street
property, Justice Thomas observed, the property was known to be
subject to the lien because the
Bank's lien applied to all after-acquired
58
limitation.
without
property
Justice Thomas further observed that state law would provide the
Bank at least some level of satisfaction. 5 9 Under typical state law, he
noted, "the Bank's interest in after-acquired real property generally
could not be defeated by an intervening statutory lien. ' 60 Although in
some states the order of docketing determines the priority of judgment
liens, 6 ' Justice Thomas observed, in other states liens that attach
simultaneously are regarded as being in parity and are satisfied on a
pro rata basis. 62 Justice Thomas also charged that the majority's
analogy to the U.C.C. was misguided, and that the rules governing
security interests in personal property have no application to judgment
liens on real63property and should not be relied upon in determining
choateness. 1
158. Id. at 1533 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas argued that in
Vermont, the Court rejected the argument that the property must be "specifically identified" as subject to the state lien. Id. He further maintained:
At the time of the federal filing [in Vermont], the debtor's interest in the bank
account, like the McDermotts' interest in the property at issue here, could
have been uncertain or indefinite from the creditors' perspective.
Nevertheless, in both cases, the particular property was "known to be subject
to the [state] lien," simply because that lien, by its terms, applied without
limitation to all property acquired at any time by the debtor.
Id. (Thomas, J.,dissenting) (citation omitted).
Justice Scalia disputed this interpretation and maintained that the debtor in Vermont
could not have acquired its interest in the bank account prior to the filing of the federal
tax lien and have that interest be uncertain. Id. at 1528 n.2. Justice Scalia then noted
that the argument the Court rejected in Vermont was not that the state lien must specifically identify the property subject to its lien, but that the state lien must attach to
specifically identified portions of the property. Id.; see also supra notes 126-28 and
accompanying text (further discussing Justice Scalia's position).
159. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1534 (Thomas, J.,dissenting) ("[U]nder state
common law, the Bank would either retain its full priority in the property by virtue of its
earlier filing or, at a minimum, share an equal interest with the competing lienor.").
Justice Thomas also maintained that even if Justice Scalia was correct in concluding that
attachment is required for choateness, the federal lien did not attach until the Bank's lien
did-when the McDermotts reacquired the South Street property. Id. at 1534 n.4
(Thomas, J., dissenting). In that event, Justice Thomas urged, the Bank's lien should be
in accordance with the common law rule of parity. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 1533 (Thomas, J.,dissenting).
161. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Lowe v. Reierson, 276 N.W. 224, 227
(Minn. 1937)).
162. McDermott, 113 S.Ct. at 1533 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Bank of Boston
v. Haufler, 482 N.E.2d 542, 547 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985); McAllen State Bank v. Saenz,
561 F. Supp. 636, 639 (S.D. Tex. 1982)).
163. Id. at 1534 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Finally, Justice Thomas concluded that the majority's narrow reading of Vermont ignored the purpose of the amendments that Congress
made to the tax lien statutes throughout the 20th century. 64 He
stressed that Congress amended the statutes in order to protect private
65
parties against harsh applications of federal tax lien priority.
According to Justice Thomas, the Court's ruling renders creditors with
security interests
in after-acquired property once again subject to secret
166
tax liens.
IV. ANALYSIS
As Justice Scalia stated in McDermott, it is difficult to discern the
meaning of the law governing federal tax lien priority.'67 To further
complicate matters, as Justice Thomas observed, precedents do not
provide a clear answer to the question of priority of liens secured by
after-acquired property. 6 Nevertheless, a sound analytical course can
be traced through the confusion. The McDermott Court failed to
recognize and follow this course. In so doing, the Court neglected to
honor the stature it had previously ascribed to final judgments, disregarded the long-standing judicial recognition that judgment liens may
be enforced against after-acquired property, and misread its own
precedents on the choateness doctrine. The Court also reversed an
eighty-year trend of protecting judgment creditors from harsh applications of the federal tax lien. Finally, McDermott renders the noticefiling provision ineffective with regard to liens on after-acquired
property and fosters a return to the days when the IRS's "secret lien"
won priority over the diligent judgment creditor. These aspects of
McDermott are examined below.
A. The HistoricalStature of Judgment Liens
It is undisputed that the Bank had received a final, binding judgment
in its litigation with the McDermotts, as opposed to only a pre-judg164. Id. at 1534 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
165. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Court's parsimonious reading of Vermont
undercuts the congressional purpose--expressed through repeated amendments to the tax
lien provisions in the century since United States v. Snyder ... of 'protect[ing] third
persons against harsh application of the federal tax lien."') (quoting Kennedy, supra
note 26, at 922).
166. Id. at 1534 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The attachment requirement erodes the
'preferred status' granted to judgment creditors by § 6323(a), and renders a choate
judgment lien in after-acquired property subordinate to a 'secret lien for assessed
taxes."') (citing Pioneer, 374 U.S. at 89).
167. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1531.
168. Id. at 1534 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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ment attachment or garnishment.'69 Historically, judgment liens like
the Bank's "ha[ve] always been regarded as the highest form of
security to a creditor."' 17 Courts have traditionally viewed the judgment lien as a final resolution of a credit dispute-the principal and
conclusive avenue of enforcing a claim against a debtor. 7 '
The Supreme Court itself has suggested that the holder of a final,
binding judgment has reached the highest level of protection. 172
Furthermore, the Court underscored the high regard it has had for
judgment creditors such as the Bank when it struck down the Security
Trust and Pioneerliens on the very basis that they had not ripened to
final judgments when federal notice was filed. 7 3 This illustrates the
essence of a judgment: It provides a final, binding determination that
may later be used to seize property and which thereby renders prior
attachments or garnishments choate. In this sense, a lien arising from
a final judgment, docketed so as to be enforceable over other parties'
interests,'74 is choate per se.
The McDermott Court also misunderstood the protection Congress
has given the judgment lien. In reaching its decision, it appears that
the Court assumed that the judicial system and Congress have not
affirmatively recognized that judgment liens may be enforced against
after-acquired property. 175 Yet cases recognizing after-acquired
169. Zions, 945 F.2d at 1477; McDermott, 113 S.Ct. at 1527; see supra note 97 and
accompanying text.
170. 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 455 (1947) (emphasis added) (citing Corporation of
America v. Marks, 73 P.2d 1215, 1217-18 (Cal. 1937); Morton v. Adams, 56 P. 1038,
1039 (Cal. 1899)).
171. Under English and American common law, "the principal avenue for a creditor to
enforce a claim for the payment of money ... was to reduce his claim to a judgment...
and thereupon to resort to the appropriate remedies for its enforcement." STEFAN A.
RIESENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 2-3 (3d ed. 1979).
172. In his dissent in United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010
(1956), Justice Douglas acknowledged: "The Court apparently holds that under [the
federal tax lien statute] a lien that is specific and choate under state law, no matter how
diligently enforced, can never prevail against a subsequent federal tax lien, short of
reducing the lien to final judgment." Id. at 1011 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
173. Security Trust, 340 U.S. at 50; Pioneer,374 U.S. at 90-91; see supra notes 53,
61 and accompanying text. In Vermont, the Court also emphasized that the choateness
doctrine had been used as a basis of subordinating liens that were not supported by a
final judgment at the time a federal lien was filed. See supra note 66. For further
discussion of the inherent choateness of the judgment lien, see infra part IV.B.
174. As in many other states, under Utah law, the judgment becomes a lien on the
debtor's property at the time it is docketed; hence it is docketing that creates the lien,
making it enforceable over other parties interests. See Orton v. Adams, 444 P.2d 62, 63
(Utah 1968).
175. Justice Scalia manifested this view in sections scattered throughout his
opinion. For example, he stated: "We did not consider [in Vermont] ...that a lien in
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property provisions in judgment liens date back to at least 1842.176 In
1909 the Supreme Court itself recognized that an Arizona statute
allowed judgment liens to extend to a debtor's after-acquired property. 77 Hence, by the time Congress extended protection to judgment
creditors in 1913 with the notice-filing provision, 7 8 it must have
known that judgment liens commonly created valid interests in afteracquired property.
The Court also concluded that because the FTLA only addressed
after-acquired property in the context of U.C.C.-type security interests, 179 Congress chose not to grant priority to judgment liens on afteracquired property. 80 Yet prior to enacting the FTLA, Congress had
already provided protection to judgment creditors with after-acquired
property interests through the notice-filing provision. 8 ' With the
FTLA, Congress was merely responding to pressure to modernize
after-acquired property is not 'perfected' as to property yet to be acquired." McDermott,
113 S. Ct. at 1529.
Regarding the FTLA, Justice Scalia wrote: "According special priority to certain state
security interests [within the commercial financing provision-§ 6323(c)] .. .obviously presumes that otherwise the federal tax lien would prevail ... regardless of when it
attaches to the subject property." Id. at 1530. He also stated: "[T]he persuasive reason
[for not giving the Bank an equal interest] is the existence of § 6323(c), which displays
the assumption that all unperfected security interests are defeated by the federal tax lien.
There is no reason why this assumption should not extend to judgment liens as well."
Id. at 1530 n.7.
176. See, e.g., Greenway & Marshall v. Cannon, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 177, 179 (1842)
(holding that a statutory lien extends to after-acquired property as well as property
owned at the time of judgment). Tennessee was not alone in linking the judgment lien to
after-acquired property. Prior to 1913, at least ten other states recognized interests in
after-acquired property created by judgment liens. Trustees of R.E. Bank v. Watson &
Hubbard, 13 Ark. 74, 82-85 (1852); Hibernia Sav. & Loan Soc'y v. London &
Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 71 P. 334, 335 (Cal. 1903); Harrison v. Roberts, 6 Fla. 711,
712-14 (1856); Wales v. Bogue, 31 Ill. 464, 467 (1863); Colt v. DuBois, 7 Neb. 391,
396 (1878); Smith v. Hogg, 40 N.E. 406, 408 (Ohio 1895); Appeal of Bucknor, 4 A.
738, 739 (Pa. 1886); Thulemeyer v. Jones, 37 Tex. 560, 571 (1872); Coad v. Cowhick,
63 P. 584, 586 (Wyo. 1901); cf. Wronkow v. Oakley, 31 N.E. 521, 524 (N.Y. 1892)
(considering an order to suspend a judgment creditor's existing rights to after-acquired
property).
177. In Bradford v. Morrison, 212 U.S. 389 (1909), the Court quoted Act No. 50 of
the Session Laws of 1891 of the territory of Arizona, page 50, § 4: "Every judgment
when so docketed shall, for a period of five years ... be a lien on the real property in the
county where the same is docketed ...[including] which [property] he may have at any
time thereafter within said period of five years." 212 U.S. at 393-94 (emphasis added).
178. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text for discussion of the 1913 noticefiling provision.
179. See supra note 84 and accompanying text for discussion of the after-acquired
property interests recognized in the FTLA.
180. See McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1530 & n.7.
18 1. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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federal tax lien law by recognizing U.C.C.-type transactions involving
after-acquired property interests.182 As for judgment liens, the FTLA
only reorganized existing 83law that had already recognized afteracquired property interests.
In sum, an historical perspective shows that the McDermott Court
should have granted priority to the Bank's judgment lien without hesitation. The lien was choate per se, in view of the time-honored
treatment of the judgment lien as the final, definite, and ultimate form
of creditor protection.'8 The after-acquired property feature of the lien
should not have altered this conclusion-that feature was nothing more
than a commonly used mechanism for securing judgment liens. The
McDermott decision should have been a straightforward application of
the notice-filing provision affording the Bank priority over the IRS.
B. Judgment Liens on After-Acquired Property are Choate
Assuming for the sake of argument that judgment liens on afteracquired property are not choate per se, they nevertheless satisfy the
New Britain choateness test-which the McDermott Court misapplied
in concluding that the Bank's lien was inchoate when the IRS filed its
notice because the specific property subject to the Bank's lien was not
established. The crux of the Court's opinion was that the Bank's lien
could be choate only after it had attached to the South Street property. "85
' This striking proposition will force creditors to act to attach
each specific piece of property that their debtors acquire, which will
ultimately render the judgment lien "largely useless" as a means of debt
collection.8 6 Additionally, the Court overlooked its earlier ruling in
Vermont, which gave priority to a state-created lien that also did not
187
attach to a particular property until after a federal lien had been filed.
182. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 82, 85-86 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 170-173 and accompanying text (discussing this aspect of the
judgment lien). See also supra note 60 (quoting Kennedy, who stated that it would be
"particularly difficult" to reconcile a judicially created concept of choateness with the
protection Congress has afforded the judgment creditor).
185. See supra notes 129-135 and accompanying text; McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at
1529-30.
186. Nickles, supra note 10, at 1141 n.10.
187. Vermont, 377 U.S. at 358-59 (rejecting the government's contention that the
Vermont liens "did not meet the standards of 'specificity' until Vermont attached the
funds held by the [debtor's bank], at which time the federal tax lien had already come
into existence") (emphasis added). Id. at 356-57. In contrast, the McDermott Court
concluded that while a state lien does not need to attach to specific portions of property,
it must still attach to a piece of property, whatever it may be, in order to be choate.
McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1528-30 & nn.2-3.
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In addition to ignoring precedent, the Court's attachment argument
also rests upon a flawed analogy and faulty logic. In justifying its
attachment requirement, the Court analogized the choateness of the
judgment lien to a U.C.C. requirement. 88 Yet, as Justice Thomas
pointed out, the U.C.C. is not relevant because it applies to personal
property. 89 Even more importantly, the U.C.C. deals with security
interests created under contract, 90 rather than with nonconsensual,
statutory interests such as judgment liens.9'
The Court also concluded that the Bank's lien was inchoate because
it was open to the contingency that the McDermotts might not reacquire
the South Street property.192 This is a stretch of reasoning that defies
the practical realities of how and why liens are used. To the extent that
the ultimate success of any lien is contingent upon a creditor taking
physical possession of the secured property, the Court's logic would
render all liens inchoate until executed-at which point the lien has
served its full purpose.
The Court also rejected the contention that the Bank's own "best
efforts" toward pursuing its lien could ensure choateness.193 This
rejection falsely assumes that executing a lien raises an after-acquired
property provision to the level of choateness. Courts have long
recognized that execution does not raise a lien to a higher status, but
instead merely constitutes the procedural means of satisfying the
lien.' 94 In addition to disregarding this basic attribute of the judgment
lien, the Court also failed to give appropriate weight to the fact that the
Bank made every possible effort to collect the amount due on the
loan-the Bank's judgment, once docketed, afforded the most
188. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1529; see supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
189. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1534 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
190. U.C.C. § 9-102(2), 3 U.L.A. 73 (1992).
19 1. Id. The Court, to justify its rule, emphasized that judgment creditors, unlike the
government, are voluntary creditors. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1531; see supra notes
139-143 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, while it may be true that the Bank was
initially a voluntary creditor, not all judgment creditors are voluntary. Victims of accidents caused by drunk drivers, for example, do not choose to become judgment creditors.
For further discussion of this distinction, see infra text accompanying note 207-08.
192. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1529 n.5. But see 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 457 (1947)
("A judgment lien is for a definite amount, and is not dependent on any contingency, or
affected by changes in the value of the property to which it attaches.") (citing Kelly v.
Minor, 252 F. 115, 116 (4th Cir. 1918)).
193. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1529 & n.4. See supra note 130 and accompanying
text.
194. See, e.g., In re Fornabai, 227 F. Supp. 928, 931 (D.N.J. 1964); Giordano v.
Wolcott, 134 A.2d 593, 595 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957), cert. denied, 143 A.2d 9
(N.J. 1958) ("An execution does not [raise a lien] to a higher status than its underlying
judgment and has no independent obligating vitality.").
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complete protection a private creditor can acquire short of actual
possession.
The Court's ruling is also off the mark in view of other precedent.
Unlike the lien defeated in Security Trust, the first decision to apply
the choateness doctrine, 95 the Bank's lien was not subject to numerous contingencies that might have prevented it from becoming choate
through a judgment. 96 The Bank's lien arose from a final judgment in
a specific dollar amount, in contrast with the liens the Court
subordinated as inchoate in Acri, 197 White Bear Brewing Co., 98 and
Pioneer,99 each of which bore contingencies that could only be
eliminated with a final judgment.
Furthermore, the property subject to the Bank lien was established,
and after-acquired property was a class of property subject to the
lien. 20 0 As specifically stated in Vermont, the same staUdard of
choateness applies to both state-created and federal liens that cover all
of a debtor's property.20" Since it is not necessary to seize specific
property to have a perfected judgment lien,20 2 in McDermott the
Bank's lien was choate when the Bank docketed its judgment.
C. Policy ConsiderationsWeigh Against the Court's Decision
The McDermott decision not only misinterprets existing law, it also
reverses an eighty-year trend of creditor protection and signals a return
to the era of the Snyder "secret lien." By effectively deeming afteracquired property provisions of judgment liens perpetually inchoate,
McDermott guarantees that federal tax liens will have priority over
judgment liens on after-acquired property, regardless of when the
government files notice of its lien. This nullifies the protection
Congress specifically provided for judgment creditors with the noticefiling provision 20 3 and gives the IRS further incentive to delay filing
195. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text; United States v. Security Trust &
Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
196. See Security Trust, 340 U.S. at 50.
197. For discussion of Acri, see supra note 53.
198. For discussion of White Bear Brewing Co., see supra notes 54 and 172.
199. For discussion of Pioneer, see supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 158 and accompanying text; McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1533 &
n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
201. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text; Vermont, 377 U.S. at 358-59.
202. United States v. State, 87 S.E.2d 577, 581 (S.C. 1955). Cf. Bank of California,
Nat'l Ass'n v. United States, 520 F.2d 302, 304-05 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding a seizure
pursuant to a judgment without a court decree choate for priority purposes).
203. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussing the notice-filing
provision and its application to judgment creditors).
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24
notice of its liens in order to facilitate tax collection. 0
In addressing the fairness of the Court's decision, Justice Scalia
maintained that the "first in time" presumption is inapposite in tax law,
which follows a "general rule" of assigning creditor priority to the
IRS.2 °5 Certainly, the priority usually afforded the IRS is largely
justified by the fundamental need for effective tax collection. 20 6 Still,
this broad favoritism toward the government highlights those instances
in which Congress has chosen to afford protection to the private creditor. Despite the force of policy arguments promoting the general rule,
the Court still cannot ignore those measures, such as the notice-filing
provision, that establish explicit exceptions.
The Court also attempted to justify its abandonment of the "first in
time" principle by stressing that as a lender, the Bank was initially a
voluntary creditor, whereas the government is an involuntary creditor
that cannot decline to take on taxpayers as debtors.20 7 While it may be
true that the Bank chose to become a creditor of the McDermotts, it
certainly did not choose to be forced to go to court in order to receive
payment of its note. Furthermore, judgment creditors include parties
holding any type of judgment. Certainly the innocent victim of a
drunk driving accident does not have the opportunity to choose a
debtor, as the Court seemed to imply.
Other equitable and practical considerations justify honoring the
"first in time" rule and giving full effect to the notice-filing provision.
The most basic reason for following the "first in time" principle is the
best reason: it promotes diligence and fairness. 20 8 Article 9 of the
204. See supra note 31 (discussing the government's interest in withholding notice).
205. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1531; see supra note 144 and accompanying text.
206. Granting a federal lien priority on the basis of promoting tax collection has
some justification. However, § 6323 applies not only to tax liens, but to federal liens
in general. See 26 U.S.C. § 6323 (1988). In keeping with Justice Scalia's logic, that
justification does not exist where the federal government is a voluntary creditor. The
Fourth Circuit recognized this nearly seventy years ago:
No sound principle of public policy can be invoked in support of preference to
the federal government and to the states over citizens in the collection of
ordinary debts. On the contrary, the contractual obligations of the federal
government and of the states have become so extensive and so involved with
the business of private citizens that priority to the federal government and to
the states, except for taxes, would operate as an oppressive hardship on other
creditors ....
Davis v. Pringle, 1 F.2d 860, 864 (4th Cir. 1924), affd, 268 U.S. 315 (1925) (emphasis
added). For further discussion, see Plumb, supra note 23, at 245-48.
207. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. at 1531.
208. McAllen State Bank v. Saenz, 561 F. Supp. 636, 639-40 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
While promoting the FI'LA, which incorporated U.C.C. concepts such as "first in time"
into federal tax lien law, one member of Congress stated: "'The intent of these amend-
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U.C.C. incorporates the "first in time" principle and thereby promotes
"legitimate business transactions" by allowing creditors to check for
past filings so they may make educated credit decisions. 209 Indeed,
Congress
2 10 adopted the FTLA to conform to the dictates of the
U.C.C.

By abandoning the "first in time" rule for liens on after-acquired
property, McDermott encourages bad faith attempts by the IRS to shift
the financing of tax debtors to unsuspecting private creditors.
McDermott assures the IRS that when it chooses to forego filing
notice, its liens on after-acquired property will not be subordinated to
judgment liens. Even if we assume that IRS failures to file notice of
tax liens occur for more innocent reasons, 21 a rule that allows the IRS
to profit from its lack of diligence is discomforting.212 Quite simply, it
is inherently unfair to allow the IRS to conceal its liens, whether intentionally or not, while private lienholders strive to win a perhaps futile
race to perfect their liens. The "first in time" rule embodied in the
notice-filing provision, therefore, is properly grounded in basic
fairness.
D. A Better Solution: Pro Rata Distribution
As the foregoing analysis illustrates, the complete subordination of
ments as they relate to the priority of federal liens is to promote equity and facilitate
commerce by making the legal rules governing tax liens more certain and fair."' Brief
for Respondent, supra note 97, at 10 n.8 (citing 112 CONG. REC. H22,227 (daily ed.
Sept. 12, 1966) (statement of Rep. Byrnes)).
209. Gallo, supra note 71, at 1014-16. As one court further noted:
It is desirable that perfection of interests take place promptly. It is appropriate then to provide that a secured party who fails to file runs the risk of subordination to a later but more diligent party. In this regard it should be pointed
out that filing is of particular importance with respect to notice to other
parties . . . .Some parties may rely on the record in extending credit and
obtaining a security agreement in collateral . . . . [lit is entirely possible that
they wanted to avoid [a] dispute altogether ... [and] may have relied on the
complete absence of a prior interest perfected or otherwise out of which a
dispute could arise. The only way this kind of record expectation can be
protected is by prompt perfection of all security interests.
In re Smith, 326 F. Supp. 1311, 1313-14 (D. Minn. 1971) (citing G. GILMORE, SECURITY
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 34.2 (1965)).
210. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
211. While there was no specific finding of bad faith by the IRS in McDermott, it is
nevertheless true that the IRS filed its notice nine months after assessing the
McDermotts, but only two months after the Bank docketed its judgment. McDermott,
113 S.Ct. at 1527; see supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
212. See Plumb, supra note 23, at 258 (urging that the federal government should not
be allowed to benefit in situations where it has failed to proceed against executors'
distributions to noncreditors).
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the Bank's lien in McDermott was insupportable and unfair. Yet,
because of the unique and compelling interest that the federal government has in tax collection, 1 3 neither should the IRS's lien have been
relegated to wholly inferior status. Rather, in cases that, like
McDermott, involve competing liens that attach simultaneously,1 4 the
liens should be satisfied with a pro rata distribution rather than on an
all-or-nothing basis.
2 5
Although some cases dictate that "all ties go to the government,"
this view dates back to 1951 dictum 21 6 and reflects antiquated thinking
that ignores modem commercial realities.2 7 At the other extreme, the
U.C.C. would grant priority in. the order of perfection 2 1'-with the
government being treated like any other creditor-and thereby give
inadequate regard to the fundamental need to collect taxes and the
higher priority generally afforded the federal government.21 9
Adopting a pro rata approach would effect a fair compromise
between these two extremes. Such an approach would ensure that the
government could collect at least some of the amount due and would
protect holders of private, choate liens. This simple and equitable
method should have been followed in McDermott in lieu of the severe
213. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
214. The district court in McDermott specifically found that in their Agreement, the
Bank and the IRS stipulated that both liens attached to the South Street property. Supra
note 106 and accompanying text; Zions, 945 F.2d at 1478. The McDermott Court,
without explicit reference to the Agreement, concluded that both the Bank's lien and the
IRS's lien attached when the McDermotts reacquired the South Street property. 113 S.
Ct. at 1530.
215. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 96 F. Supp. 318, 321 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd
sub noa., California v. United States, 195 F.2d 530 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
831 (1952); MDC Leasing Corp. v. New York Property Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 450 F.
Supp. 179, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd without opinion, 603 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1979),
and aff'd sub nom., New York Property Ins. Underwriting Ass'n v. Derrico Co., 603 F.2d
214 (2d Cir. 1979).
216. See Graham, 96 F. Supp. at 321.
2 17. The Fifth Circuit elaborated on the weakness of this outdated approach:
In our view, another aspect of choateness that no longer floats, although
concededly not specifically addressed by § 6323, is the notion that a tie goes
to the government. To the extent that the purpose of the Federal Tax Lien Act
was to conform tax liens to [U.C.C.] Article 9 security interests, the way to
achieve this goal is to treat the government like any other creditor. Giving
the government's filed tax lien priority over a simultaneously recorded
security interest would defeat this goal. We do not believe that is what
Congress intended.
Southern Rock Inc. v. B & B Auto Supply, 711 F.2d 683, 689 (5th Cir. 1983).
218. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a), 3A U.L.A. 350 (1992); see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing this important need).
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and unfounded action taken by the Court. 220
V.

IMPACT

By requiring that a judgment lien on after-acquired property must
attach to specific property in order to achieve choateness for purposes
of federal lien priority, the McDermott ruling has severely undermined
the effectiveness of the judgment lien as a method of debt collection. 22'
Granted, although the judgment lien may now be useless against the
federal government, it will still be effective against a competing private
creditor. Yet as the Bank in McDermott would be quick to point out,
this is small consolation. The United States government is a creditor
to many, and financially distressed individuals and companies often
have large tax liabilities.
For banks, insurance companies, credit agencies, and any other
business that extends credit, McDermott will greatly increase the costs
of lending. As one commentator has suggested, a requirement that a
judgment lien must actually attach to specific after-acquired property in
order to be choate will force lienholders to monitor their debtor's
transactions very closely and act quickly to attach property passing
through the debtor's estate. 2 The result will be increased expenses
and diminished protection for creditors relying on judgment liens.
In turn, debtors will also suffer, as creditors pass along their
increased costs in various ways. First, the credit supply may shrink,
albeit slightly, as creditors seek less exposure in potentially subordinated positions. Second, interest rates may increase, as creditors seek
to compensate for their increased risk. Finally, creditors may demand
greater collateral as security for their exposure. Though all debtors
will suffer, perhaps the greatest impact will be felt by poor or marginal
credit risks. Such debtors will find it much more difficult to obtain
credit because they are the ones most likely to have delinquent federal
tax obligations.
While debtors will fall victim to McDermott, involuntary creditors
220. This approach has been followed in at least one case with facts similar to those
in McDermott. In McAllen State Bank v. Saenz, 561 F. Supp. 636, 638 (S.D. Tex.
1982), the court weighed the priorities of a federal tax lien and a prior choate judgment
lien, both of which claimed rights to the proceeds of a sale of after-acquired real property. As had the Court in McDermott, the McAllen court concluded that both liens
attached at the same time. See id. at 639. After rejecting the "tie goes to the
government" rule, the McAllen court divided the proceeds pro rata. Id. See also United
States v. Fleming, 474 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Southern Rock, 711 F.2d. at
689 (both dividing sums on a pro rata basis).
221. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
222. Nickles, supra note 10, at 1141 n.10.
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will be harmed as well. By failing to allow for those creditors who do
not truly "choose" their debtors, the McDermott Court extended the
force of its ruling to both voluntary creditors, such as the Bank, and
involuntary creditors, such as parties holding tort judgments secured
by after-acquired property. It appears that the Court did not realize that
its decision will have this effect. This shortsighted aspect of
McDermott will damage even those who assume their "creditor" status
unwillingly.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under McDermott, a judgment lien covering after-acquired property
is by definition inchoate and thus receives no priority over a federal tax
lien, regardless of when the IRS files notice. The McDermott ruling
thus disregards the nature of judgment liens, misinterprets the Court's
earlier decisions, and signals a return to the era of the "secret" federal
tax lien. Under McDermott, the Internal Revenue Service may opt to
conceal its liens, while private lien holders strive to win a race to
obtain priority over each other that may ultimately prove worthless.
McDermott will likely impair the collection of judgment liens of all
types and may restrict the credit supply. For all these reasons, the
harsh rule of McDermott should be overturned by Congress or the
Court.
MICHAEL D. MCCULLOUGH

